contributed to law's formal statements, those subjected to its enforcement and yet able at times to resist and/or reinterpret, and those who consciously reconstructed the law for their own purposes…," those efforts become part of a legal culture made up of a "plurality of authorized behaviors and authorizing discourses," "a multitude of possibilities, arguments, strategies, positions, located in various institutions and in the imaginations of a complex and diverse citizenry," and the relationships between all these elements. 9 Working-class legal culture understood a charge of statutory rape as the final stage in a process that began outside the courts, and saw the legal system as a means to an end other than the punishment laid down in the law. To understand that process, that legal culture, in the terms that working-class New Yorkers did, rather than in terms of the formal law, requires us to look at the whole process, the extra-legal efforts and their extension into the legal system. Understanding working-class legal culture also involves distinguishing it from a middle-class culture that avoided recourse to the law out of a concern to protect reputation. In the twentieth century, middle-class Americans looked to an evolving range of alternatives to courts -private networks, private maternity homes and reformatories, child guidance clinics, and psychiatrists -but a lack of resources, and class prejudices, kept those options closed to most workers.
The case files also reveal that, at different points in the legal process, a range of officials -officers of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC), assistant district attorneys, jurors, and judges --lent their support to the efforts of working class families to bring about marriages between young women and the men who had 'ruined' them. Legal officials put pressure on men to agree to marriage, facilitated marriages, and dismissed charges of rape once a marriage had taken place.
Despite their formal responsibility to enforce the law, officials placed extra-legal outcomes ahead of the outcomes prescribed by the law. Such support meant that workingclass efforts to use the law to make right a girl's ruin proceeded without the same degree of interference and scrutiny that similar, more studied, efforts to use criminal law, juvenile courts and social agencies attracted.
My argument is that the reason why ordinary New Yorkers were relatively successful in gaining access to the legal system lies in fact that both the means and the ends that they sought were traditional, well-established, responses to extra-marital sexual behavior. A modern sensibility did develop in the early twentieth century, one that saw forced marriage as a problem not a solution; given the absence of love, and the immaturity of teenage girls, it was claimed that such a marriage could only produce a catalogue of social problems. But the adherents of that new view, particularly the social work professionals, had less influence in criminal courts than they did in juvenile courts, maternity homes, and social agencies. Many of the judges who presided over the criminal courts, as well as many of the lawyers who appeared before them, continued to display an older, 'Victorian,' sensibility, one that emphasized female chastity, that saw teenage girls as mature, and that tolerated male sexual license. Although those notions set judges at odds with social workers, reformers, and young women seeking to carve out modern identities, as Odem and Alexander have shown, they also tended to ally judges with those who saw a girl as ruined and sought to make right her condition through marriage. Legal officials could more easily actively support the aims of working-class New Yorkers because, unlike efforts by families to institutionalize 'problem girls,' or to obtain support from social agencies, a marriage cost those officials nothing, and could even save the state the cost of imprisonment, or of providing support for an illegitimate child. 10 In part then, working-class New Yorkers gained access to the law because judges did not simply create and adhere to a coherent system of normative values and beliefs, as much legal history would have it, but, as Hendrick Hartog has recently argued, were required to "improvise solutions to immediate and intractable conflicts, using the imperfect materials of an inherited and changing legal order." 11 Finally, the case files offer striking evidence of the persistence of the practice of forced marriage into the second quarter of the twentieth century, well after the time when historians have assumed that the modern sensibility that rejected the practice had become ascendant. This is not to say that nothing changed in the 60 years covered by my study.
Thus, after 1920, girls began to speak of being in love, signalling the spread of the middleclass concern that romantic love should be the basis of marriage. In this period, too, the State Legislature amended the law to prevent and restrict the marriage of young girls, and adopted new paternity laws and proceedings. Moreover, jurors, prosecutors, and judges became less willing to support efforts to pressure men to marry girls who had lost their virginity but not become pregnant. But the practice of forced marriage survived and maintained its leading place in the working-class response to female sexuality despite those changes. The rising tide of modern ideas about sexuality and childhood did not wash away the concerns about 'ruin' that many working-class New Yorkers held; rather it eroded the scope of those concerns and carried them to a variety of different locations within the legal system. In the face of historians' preoccupation with the new, with the dramatic breakdown of the traditional, my concern is to direct attention to the less obvious, but arguably more substantial, continuities in working-class legal culture, continuities that raise questions about the nature of modernity.
This article begins by delineating the extensive range of circumstances encompassed by the concept of 'ruin.' I then trace the process by which working-class New Yorkers attempted to make right a girl's ruin, first exploring the extra-legal dimensions of the process --the investigations, confrontations and negotiations undertaken by working-class girls, the men with who they had sex, and their families -and then examine the ways in which those efforts were overlaid on the legal process of arrest, Marriage also, at least formally, offered the opportunity to shift the burden of providing for a girl from her family to the man who had ruined her. 13 Middle-class reformers often lamented that the marriages of ruined girls, particularly marriages into which the man had been forced, lacked any substance and often quickly collapsed; but even a brief marriage that existed in form only did win for some girls a degree of respectability in their communities. 14 When a man's wedded state or other circumstances made his marriage to the girl he had ruined impossible, working-class families commonly sought a financial settlement from him as an alternative to wedlock. Payment of a lump sum, or regular payments for the support of a child, went some way towards ameliorating a girl's dependency, but, except where the money allowed a pregnant girl to be sent away from her community to have her child, it failed to restore a girl's respectability.
The Manhattan County District Attorney's case files add another level of specific detail to this familiar description of the concept of ruin, detail that gives the concept a less familiar shape. The notion of ruin that can be glimpsed in the case files encompasses a more extensive range of circumstances than has generally been recognized. Workingclass families like the Tedescos pursued a girl's marriage when she lost her virginity, even if, like Elizabeth, she lost it to a man she had not known before he 'ruined' her. Families more often made efforts to arrange a marriage or a financial settlement when a girl's ruin extended beyond the loss of virginity to pregnancy (see Table 1 ). 
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The sample of cases files that contained documents that would reveal such efforts are drawn from a larger sample, every statutory rape case I could identify prosecuted in each sample year, which included 517 further cases.
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The totals for these two years are aberrantly low because assistant district attorneys or their clerks appear to have stopped the practice of recording that a grand jury had dismissed a case because the couple had married. In 1936 there are twelve cases, and 1941 a further six cases, in which a grand jury dismissed the charges against a man who admitted impregnating a girl. Usually such a dismissal meant that the couple married --in my nine other sample years there are only four such cases that did not involve a marriage --but these files include no mention of an extra-legal outcome.
Pregnancy clearly altered how Ellen Wilson's parents sought to deal with her ruin. Sixteen year old Ellen ran away from home in 1916, after her father discovered that she had lost her virginity. She found work, and an apartment, and persuaded Harry Donovan, the man she had been seeing, and having intercourse with for almost three years, to move in with her. The couple lived together for two months before the police found them. At the time of Donovan's arrest, Ellen's parents insisted that he be prosecuted, and refused to have anything to do with their daughter. However, by the time prosecutors had prepared the trial brief, Ellen's parents, having found out that she was pregnant, were no longer willing to prosecute Donovan. They now wanted the couple to get married. The Wilsons' change of heart could have resulted from their concern about the care, or the legitimacy, of their grandchild. Or, like many New York City parents, they may have feared that the costs of Ellen's pregnancy would fall on them.
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The Tedesco family were also not unique in adhering to a concept of ruin that made no more allowance for the circumstances in which a girl lost her virginity than it did for the duration of her relationship with the man responsible for her condition. Elizabeth's family regarded her as ruined, and sought to bring about her marriage, even though the prospective husband had accomplished her ruin through the use of force. In twenty-five cases, or fifteen percent (N=165) of the cases I investigated that involved extra-legal efforts, the girl alleged that the defendant had forced her to have sexual intercourse. Even more strikingly, ten of the girls who stated that they had been raped themselves sought marriage. Seventeen year old Susan Russell, for example, charged that Peter Waldstein, a twenty-six year old Russian salesman, had put drugs in her wine, and, once she lost consciousness, had had intercourse with her. In return for his promise to marry her, however, Susan agreed not to tell her brothers about the assault, and regularly went with Waldstein to hotels, for the purpose of sexual intercourse. Only when she became pregnant, and he refused to go through with the marriage, did Susan tell her brothers.
They confronted Waldstein, who threatened to have them arrested for blackmail; instead, Susan and her family had him arrested and charged with rape. As in other similar cases, the middle-class assistant district attorney saw Susan's willingness to remain involved with Waldstein as inconsistent with her claim that he had coerced her. In the terms in which most working-class immigrants viewed sexuality, however, Susan's behaviour was entirely consistent: once ruined, a girl had little prospect of marriage to anyone other than the man who had ruined her. That situation made it more difficult than middle-class prosecutors allowed for a ruined woman to spurn a man who had coerced her. Moreover, the firm distinction between coerced and consensual intercourse made by prosecutors did not exist in the culture of working-class youth. Violence against women constituted an unexceptional part of the sexual behaviour of young men, a common occurrence even in sexual relationships into which girls willingly entered. In this sexual culture, the fact that a man had coerced a girl did not necessarily represent an obstacle to their marriage. In the event, Waldstein did eventually marry Susan Russell, whereupon the assistant district attorney dropped the charges against him. 16 Although the case files clearly show that parents and relatives of girls who had been subjected to sexual attack saw them as ruined, the files also offer glimpses of the attitudes and actions of a small proportion of the girls, glimpses that suggest that, even some girls who had not been coerced, regarded themselves as having been ruined. In twenty-six cases, or sixteen percent (N=165) of the cases in my sample that involved extra-legal efforts to make right a girl's ruin, the files reveal that girls did share their families' sense that they were ruined once they lost their virginity, particularly if pregnancy followed. Some pregnant girls themselves tried to get the man in question to marry them, and expressed the same concern to legitimate their children, and to ameliorate their dependence, that their families displayed. Marion McBride, a seventeen-year-old domestic servant, had sexual intercourse with James Gray, a seventeen-year-old AfricanAmerican pianist, on several occasions in the second half of 1935, and became pregnant as a result. Gray first gave her money to go to a doctor for an abortion, but apparently Marion could not procure one, because he later promised "to stay with her and have the baby." Several weeks later, Gray announced that he was "in no position to marry her."
Marion then went to the police and charged the vacillating Gray with rape. At his arraignment in the Magistrates Court, she stated she was still in love with him; she also revealed that she had lost her job several months earlier, a circumstance that evidently contributed to her decision to bring charges against Gray, in order, that is, to obtain his help in supporting their child.
17 Marion's relationship with Gray, and her declaration that she wanted to marry him because she was "in love" with him, expressed a romantic view of marriage common to most girls at the center of prosecutions in the years after 1920. In earlier decades, girls had not talked of being in love, a reflection of a working-class emphasis on a man's ability to be a dependable provider and a woman's ability to supply help and domestic services. These attributes contrasted with the emphasis on emotional intimacy, valued by the middle-class as the key to marriage. A new concern with being in love seems likely to have narrowed the circumstances in which girls would have pressured a man to marry them -it was at the root of African-American girls' reluctance to marry the fathers of their children in the 1960s -but the continuing adherence of many parents to the older vision of marriage must temper that conclusion. 18 The concept of ruin made a man responsible for a girl's condition, and put the onus on him to "do the right thing," as Elizabeth Tedesco's brother Paul had put it when he had confronted Angelo Bonelli. When confronted, almost all the men in my sample admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the girl in question, but in only one third of the cases did men or their families propose that the case be settled through a marriage. 19 There is some evidence to suggest that the reason why a greater proportion of the men charged with statutory rape did not propose marriage was that different cultures held men responsible for a girl's ruin to different degrees. In a sociological study of the community of Greenwich Village carried out in the 1920s, Caroline Ware argued that Italians, regardless of their class and degree of Americanization, believed that, "If a boy got a girl into trouble, the fault lay with the girl's father who had not protected her." The Irish, by contrast, were "more ready to lay responsibility on the man." 20 A further explanation for the failure of more men to propose marriage is a sexual double standard that limited male responsibility for sexual acts with a girl who had already lost her virginity. As late as the 1930s, sociologist William Whyte reported that, in an Italian slum district of an Eastern city,
A man who takes her virginity from a "good girl," seriously affecting her marriageability, will marry her because he is responsible.…[If a girl] enjoys a good reputation, her family will be able to exert a good deal of pressure to force a marriage. If he makes her pregnant, marriage is hardly to be avoided. The promiscuous girl is less desirable socially, but there is also less risk in having relations with her. Only pregnancy can impose a responsibility and…such entanglements may frequently be avoided. 21 Even in the case of a girl who had already lost her virginity, becoming pregnant outside marriage compounded her ruin. She passed on the same stigma of illegitimacy to her child, and she suffered the same economic pressures that a 'good girl' did. But, since her earlier sexual activity had damaged her social standing, the man who had made her pregnant felt less social pressure to make right that ruin than the man who had made a 'good girl' pregnant. Some of the men who agreed to 'do the right thing,' were motivated by their earlier promise to marry a girl should she become pregnant. But most men proposed marriage not in order to do the right thing, but to avoid punishment. In 1916, for example, Anna Polentz sought to arrange the marriage of her twenty-two year old son, Leo, a clerk, to fifteen year old Catherine Meyerhoff. Fearing that her father would beat her for returning late from a visit she and Leo had made to the theater, Catherine had gone with
Leo to a hotel. During the night, he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. They stayed on in the hotel for two days, until Polentz heard that the police were looking for them and went to his mother for help. After consulting a lawyer, Anna Polentz announced that the couple had to get married. She took Catherine home and tried to persuade the girl's parents to consent to the marriage, but they refused to give it.
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When a girl's family refused an offer to make right her 'ruin' through marriage, as they did in nineteen, or twelve percent (N=165), of the cases in my sample, the case files indicate that they were usually motivated by concerns as to how effectively the marriage would make right a girl's ruin, but not, as I noted earlier, about the circumstances in which the couple had had intercourse. Some parents, the Meyerhoffs among them, rejected an offer of marriage because they did not think the man could adequately provide for their daughter. In other cases, parents objected to the bad character of the man, which usually meant that he had served time in prison. Ethnicity also operated as an obstacle to marriage. Jewish parents, for example, often regarded both Italian and Irish men as inappropriate husbands for their daughters.
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The extensive range of circumstances that fell within the gambit of working-class New Yorkers' concept of ruin helps explain why such a high proportion of statutory rape prosecutions involved efforts to make right a girl's ruin. Ordinary New Yorkers approached instances where no relationship existed between a girl and the man with whom she had sexual intercourse, and instances where a man used force to compel a girl to have sexual intercourse with him, as acts that ruined a girl and created a condition that could be made right by her marriage to the man in question. Only among the cases in which a girl had sexual intercourse with a man in return for money, or some other form of payment, are there no examples of efforts to arrange a marriage.
Working-class girls and their families began their pursuit of marriage and financial settlements to make right a girl's ruin by using informal, extra-legal and local means. In early-twentieth-century New York City, informal, neighborhood ties, particularly among women, helped to police sexual behavior. Families conducted their own investigations, sometimes involving doctors, and confronted men whom girls alleged had 'ruined' them.
Only when those informal efforts failed, when additional pressure needed to be applied to a recalcitrant man, did working-class New Yorkers look to the formal law, and seek to apply additional pressure through the threat of imprisonment. These extra-legal measures appear only on the margins of existing accounts of the efforts to police female sexuality, which has the effect of subordinating them to the legal system. What is largely overlooked here is the extent to which they took place in the shadow of the law, and indeed the extent to which they shaped the legal dimensions of efforts to respond to the sexual activity of teenage girls.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, working-class New Yorkers continued to display a degree of interest in their neighbors' activities, and a willingness both to help parents maintain authority over their children, and to intervene when they observed suspicious behavior, that had been evident in the city's working-class neighborhoods throughout the nineteenth century. 24 Charles Morris, a twenty-four year old shipping clerk, owed his conviction for statutory rape in 1896 to such community policing. Morris met Ethel Katz, a fourteen year old school girl, on the street, and, over the following weeks, took walks with her, before asking her to come to his room. Morris went into his building first, and had Ethel follow a short time later. However, the janitress, scrubbing the steps, saw through this subterfuge, spoke to the landlady, and sent a male tenant to tell Ethel's mother that they believed the girl "was in a room with a man." the defendant had done to her daughter, and that both the defendant and his mother refused to admit or deny anything about it; that she said she would bring her daughter to confront the defendant, but when she returned with her daughter, the defendant had gone downstairs and refused to come up to face the girl; that she informed Mrs. Lewis she would give her a day or two to "think it over," and not hearing anything from her, she took her daughter to the Fifth District Court…and made the complaint of rape. 27 Olive Smith's trip to the court makes it clear that the legal option of laying a charge of rape lay in the background of extra-legal efforts to force a marriage: when a girl or her family asked a man to 'do the right thing,' they were offering him a choice between marriage and prosecution. As sixteen year old Ellen Marcus put it, in testimony in the Magistrates court in 1911, "if he married me then there would be no trouble now." 28 In effect, and whoever initiated them, extra-legal efforts to make right a girl's 'ruin' through marriage took place not so much outside the legal system as in its shadow. Most men caught having sexual intercourse with teenage girls were aware that this shadow had fallen over them. Paul Covello offered to marry Rosa Pirelli "if that would get him out of trouble," a phrase used by many of the men at the center of statutory rape cases. The efforts of working-class families to pressure men into marriage extended into the legal system, in part because the creation of the offence of statutory rape at the end of the nineteenth century gave them more scope for this approach. That had not been the intention of the reformers who came together under the banner of purity reform in New
York, and succeeded, by 1895, in having the age of consent raised from ten years --the common law age adopted in most state laws --to eighteen years, and in making the age of consent the basis of a distinct form of rape. Reformers saw the increased age of consent as a weapon in the fight against prostitution, as a means of establishing a single standard of sexual control and morality, and as a way of extending to teenage girls the protection the law gave to children. Working-class families, by contrast, saw the law as offering a means of dealing with the social consequences that a girl faced as a result of having sexual intercourse outside marriage, a goal that implicitly treated a teenage girl as an adult, rather than as a child. The key to the effectiveness of the new offence of statutory rape lay in the fact that, although the law simply punished men, and did not formally make right a girl's ruin, it cast a longer shadow than had the older legal categories of rape, seduction and abduction. Under the older statutes, only men who had physically forced a girl to have intercourse with them, or who had promised marriage to win a girl's consent, or who had either married her or put her to work as a prostitute without her parents' permission, needed to fear prosecution. With the creation of the offence of statutory rape, any man who had sexual intercourse with a girl under eighteen years of age, whatever the circumstances, faced the prospect of prosecution and imprisonment for up to ten years.
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For working-class families, the development of statutory rape provided new opportunities to use the law as a lever, a threat, or a bargaining chip, in their efforts to make right a girl's ruin.
Although, in the 1920s, the space that existed in the legal system for working-class efforts to force marriage contracted and changed its form, girls and their families continued to find ways to use the courts to achieve their ends. The frequent marriages that resulted from statutory rape prosecutions in New York in the early decades of the twentieth century attracted the attention of reformers, and provided one impetus for campaigns to change and enforce New York's marriage laws. Reformers argued that an increase in the minimum age of marriage was necessary in order to prevent parents from consenting to the marriage of their teenage children. By the 1920s, the belief of reformers that, as Jane Addams put it, marriage operated as a "restraint, a control producing upright living," had been undermined by their new attention to psychological development, and their perception that early marriage created more problems than it solved. Reformers' campaigns against such "child marriages" spurred the Legislature to raise the minimum age of marriage in New York to sixteen years for girls -or fourteen years with the permission of a Children's Court judge --and to tighten enforcement of those laws.
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The new marriage laws formally narrowed the space that the legal system allowed for working-class efforts to use a charge of rape to pressure men to agree to marriage, but did not entirely preclude those efforts. Some families chose to stay away from the courts rather than submit to judicial scrutiny, putting off formalizing marriages which they had arranged until a girl turned sixteen years of age. Not all of those families successfully surmounted the risks inherent in that strategy: vacillating men and suspicious school officials unravelled some families' arrangements before the marriage took place, and brought the couple into the courts. Other parents continued to come to courts, seeking the permission they now needed to secure a marriage.
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At the same time that changes to the marriage laws imposed restrictions on efforts to force marriages, the development of new criminal paternity proceedings offered workingclass families a new avenue by which to put pressure on men, one that could be used in conjunction with a charge of rape, albeit only in cases where a girl became pregnant. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Poor Law officials handled bastardy cases, and prosecuted men only when children were in danger of becoming public charges. In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Progressive child welfare movement began to urge the reform of bastardy laws. The reform campaign grew out of recognition of the peculiar vulnerability of illegitimate children to an early death, to ill-treatment, and to dependency on the state. The campaigns promoted reform of bastardy laws in lieu of more radical proposals to grant illegitimate children the same rights as legitimate ones. In 1925, the New York Legislature created new criminal paternity proceedings, proceedings that provided another way for families to secure financial support for an unmarried mother and her child. In New York City, the Court of Special Sessions was empowered to conduct hearings to establish a child's paternity, and to make orders that fixed a weekly sum to be paid by the man declared to be a child's father until the child reached sixteen years of age.
Families, rather than only Poor Law officials, could initiate actions, and they could use them as an additional lever to pressure men into marriage, and to obtain, and collect, support payments negotiated outside the legal system. Any out-of-court settlement was not binding upon the mother unless the court reviewed and approved it; without that approval, she was free to bring paternity proceedings which, given the payments already made, would almost certainty result in a support order.
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Working-class New Yorkers' efforts to pressure men into marriage survived within the legal system, and often succeeded, because of the crucial support they received from legal officials. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a concern to make the law less accessible to personal use, and more effective in controlling specific populations, had led class families the belief that girls who had sexual intercourse outside marriage were ruined, and that marriage was the only way to remedy that condition, even in the case of teenage girls. Those beliefs sometimes led judges to disregard legal rules and stretch legal categories, or endorse the efforts of others to do so, in an effort to obtain that remedy. 43 Officers of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC) were the first legal officials encountered by most of those working-class New
Yorkers who had laid a charge of rape with the aim of pressuring a man into marrying a ruined girl. The NYSPCC, a private child protection agency incorporated by the state, had a formal role in the New York legal system that extended to shaping, enforcing and administering criminal law relating to children in New York City, including the statutory rape law. Not only did the state grant powers of arrest and prosecution to the Society's officers, but the police turned all cases that involved children under sixteen years of age over to the Society to investigate, assistant district attorneys relied on the Society's officers to prepare cases for trial, and judges sought their assent to plea-bargains. With considerable justification, the NYSPCC claimed that it constituted a "component part of the city government." 44 The elite philanthropists who directed the NYSPCC committed the Society's officers to a view of teenage girls as children in need of protection, and to law enforcement and the punishment of offenders as the only effective means of protecting children marked the work of the Society's officers. Although most child protection agencies adopted a social work approach at the turn of the century, the NYSPCC maintained its orientations throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 45 Both concerns could have been expected to lead NYSPCC officers' to obstruct working-class efforts to use the law to pressure men into marriages. In practice, however, its officers proved more pragmatic, adapting to the attitudes of the assistant district attorneys and the judges, who had the greatest influence on how a case would be resolved. When a man who admitted impregnating a fifteen year old girl asked one NYSPCC officer "what was the customary thing to do in these cases," the officer replied, "sometimes they married and sometimes they stood trial." 46 NYSPCC officers did not so much encourage or endorse marriages in statutory rape cases as act as intermediaries in the efforts of others to achieve that end. In one case in 1936, two officers literally acted as intermediaries, conveying an offer of marriage made by a man being questioned at a police station to the mother of the girl for whose rape he had been arrested. 47 More often, NYSPCC officers simply directed the parties involved in a prosecution to the District Attorney's Office. When Joseph Angelico, an eighteen year old Italian errand boy, was charged with the rape of fifteen year old Maria Ferranti and released on bail, he approached the Society, which had the pregnant Maria in custody, and sought to marry her. The Superintendent of the NYSPCC responded by sending Angelico to the assistant district attorney, a referral that began a process by which the families involved resolved the case through the marriage of Joseph and Maria.
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In a typical pattern of action, the assistant district attorney, after meeting with Angelico and both families, recommended to the judge that the couple be allowed to marry. When the couple supplied the assistant district attorney with proof of their marriage, he obtained the judge's permission to recommend to the grand jury that the charge against Angelico be dismissed. 49 When circumstances made it difficult for a marriage to be performed, assistant district attorneys sometimes went beyond telling families what they needed to do, and themselves helped with the process. After Mary Fine, seventeen years old and seven months pregnant, charged nineteen-year-old Michael
Bell with rape, in an effort to get him to fulfil his promise to marry her, the assistant district attorney asked the Youth Counsel Bureau to arrange the couple's marriage.
Because Bell was on parole, he needed the permission of his parole officer to marry. The
Bureau obtained that permission, as well as the couple's birth certificates, and arranged for them to be issued a marriage license. 50 Some assistant district attorneys went as far as putting pressure on men to go through with a marriage. After the establishment of the new paternity proceedings, prosecutors typically coupled a statutory rape charge to paternity proceedings that involved underage girls. If a man agreed to pay support, assistant district attorneys typically urged the grand jury not to indict him for rape, and, if the grand jury did indict him, district attorneys allowed him to plead guilty to a lesser offense and receive a suspended sentence. The fear of being charged with statutory rape helps explain why so few men contested paternity proceedings in New York City in this period.
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There is little direct evidence as to assistant district attorneys' motives for such actions. In one case in 1906, a man, told by an assistant district attorney to produce a marriage certificate within two days or face prosecution for rape, later filed for divorce on the grounds that the district attorney had coerced him into marriage. The District Attorney's Office defended itself by asserting that the assistant district attorney "had merely followed the precedent established in the police courts and the Court of General Sessions in similar cases." 52 That statement, the most explicit expression of prosecutors' attitudes that the case files offer, suggests both that the District Attorney's Office was not committed to enforcing the law when the parties sought a marriage, and that, in supporting marriages, assistant district attorneys followed the lead of magistrates and trial court judges.
In addition to an assistant district attorney's endorsement, working-class families required the support of both a grand jury and a judge in order to secure a marriage and to extract a couple from the legal system. The marriage of Joseph Angelico and Maria
Ferranti referred to earlier makes that clear. Grand juries of working and middle-class New Yorkers could have indicted a man like Joseph Angelico, despite the assistant district attorney's recommendation that they dismiss the charges against him. 53 Not only was marriage not a formal defense to statutory rape in New York law, but grand juries in other circumstances, particularly when faced with sexually experienced girls who had offered unambiguous consent, regularly rejected district attorneys' recommendations that they indict defendants and instead effectively nullified the statutory rape law. 54 When the parties to a case had married, however, grand juries did follow district attorneys' claimed that four out of five statutory rape cases could be solved through marriage, and who attacked the NYSPCC for unnecessarily dragging couples into the courts. 56 It is important to note that not all judges acted in this way. Commentators also observed a lack of uniformity in the attitudes and in the decisions of the judges who presided over the city's criminal courts. Moreover, judges in the juvenile courts, who were often allied with child protectors and shared their modern idea that childhood extended beyond puberty, more frequently opposed the marriage of teenage girls than did those who sat in the criminal courts. In the 1940s, for example, Paul Tappan found that most judges in New York City's Wayward Minor Court, a court that had jurisdiction over girls aged between sixteen and twenty-one years, preferred to institutionalize girls, rather than to allow them to marry. But even in this court, there was one judge who saw marriage as the most desirable outcome. that the gap between form and substance made marriage ineffective as a response to a girl's ruin. Towne lamented the fact that, once the charges against them had been dropped, men often mistreated, or abandoned their wives, leaving them facing the same struggle to support themselves that they had confronted before their marriage. 64 The judge in the Lione case, by contrast, was typical of his colleagues in taking the view that there was "no good reason" to believe that marriage would fail to make right a girl's ruin.
Once a girl had become pregnant, judges also supported her marriage on the grounds that it prevented her ruin from being passed on to her child, in the form of the stigma of illegitimacy. Children's court judges, given no legal guidelines as to how they should use their discretionary power to permit the marriage of fourteen and fifteen year old girls, generally agreed that they should give pregnant girls permission to marry. "It always seemed to me harsh for us to refuse to give a name to an unborn child," Judge Scripture remarked, in 1930, to the general assent of his colleagues.
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It is not simply the beliefs that judges exhibited, but those that they did not, that help explain why they supported working-class efforts to secure a marriage. To act on their beliefs, judges had to step outside the rape statute, outside formal legal categories and rules, as had the judge in halting Michael Lione's trial when he promised to marry Donna
Gallo. But we do not hear judges lamenting how the formal law restricted them from acting to help families. They appear not as men constrained by statute and precedent, but as men willing to improvise a solution, particularly one that employed a legal form, marriage, which reflected long-standing custom, and which cost them nothing. Even judges in the Children's Court balanced the modern concern with the immaturity of teenage girls that formed the premise on which their court had been founded with a willingness to improvise; as one judge told his colleagues in 1927, "you can't lay down any hard and fast rules, you have to get the facts, you have to study them and see what is for the welfare of the girl, the child involved, and if you do that there will be some instances, as you well understand, where they ought to get married…." 66 Judges also
showed little sensitivity to the modern ideas of childhood and sexuality that persuaded social workers to reject forced marriage. Few proponents of those ideas had a role in New York City's criminal court system; because it rejected social work, the NYSPCC did not bring to statutory rape cases the modern perspective that a social agency involved in the legal process might have been expected to display. Older ideas remained so entrenched in the criminal justice system that, as Ruth Alexander has argued persuasively, even the psychiatrists and social workers who were affiliated with the courts reinforced rather than overturned the court's emphasis on female sexual purity. 67 In part because modern ideas were less influential in the criminal courts, the concept of ruin and marriage as the means of making right that condition appears to have survived among judges in these courts to a greater degree than it did among their colleagues in the juvenile courts, or among the staff of maternity homes and reformatories.
There are signs that modern ideas did begin to influence legal officials in the second quarter of the twentieth century, but not to a degree sufficient to persuade them to entirely abandon the concept of ruin. After 1920, grand jurors, middle-class assistant district attorneys, and judges were less willing to force men to marry girls who had not become pregnant. They did not see sexual intercourse outside marriage as having, for a girl, social consequences of such a magnitude that they warranted requiring the man involved to marry her. Often following a district attorney's recommendation, grand juries were less inclined to provide the indictments necessary to put pressure on men to marry girls: they indicted only those men who coerced a girl who had not previously had sexual intercourse, men who knew their partner was under the age of consent, and men who failed to marry or provide support for a girl who had become pregnant. Most Children's Court judges refused girls under sixteen years of age who had been 'ruined,' but had not become pregnant, permission to marry. They argued that sparing girls' "disgrace" did not constitute sufficient grounds for relaxing the law. Some judges did, however, continue to
give Southern and Eastern European girls permission to marry, emphasising the need to recognize their different physiology and culture. 68 The diminished support offered to working-class families did not put an end either to those families' belief that girls who had sexual intercourse outside marriage were ruined, or to their practice of using the law to make right that ruin. Those ideas also survived outside working-class neighbourhoods, among middle-class legal officials who were only beginning to be influenced by modern ideas. To accommodate those continuities in our picture of mid-century American culture, we need to shake off the view that modern notions simply superseded older understandings. The wave of new ideas about sexuality and childhood that swept through the mainstream of American culture failed to reach all the pools and eddies of that culture, allowing older ideas to survive. We are used to thinking about such persistence as leading only to conflict: holding to traditional beliefs drew immigrant parents into a struggle with middle-class reformers and social work professionals, and set them at odds with their 'modern,' working daughters.
Pursuing those conflicts has led historians to focus on institutions like courts, maternity homes and reformatories. But the survival of older ideas produced continuity as well as conflict. A clear picture of that constancy emerges only when we step back from a narrow focus on the courts and other institutions. By reducing the legal system to just part of the picture, we are able to see that New Yorkers, for whom sexual purity, rather sexual desire, remained at the heart of female sexuality, and who still saw sexually active girls as "ruined," maintained the practice of employing both extra-legal and legal means to bring about a marriage that made right that condition. In the criminal court system, families rarely encountered legal officials or social work professionals who had been influenced by modern ideas, whose perspective would have made them an obstacle to efforts to secure the marriage of a ruined girl. Seeking a traditional outcome that did not impose an economic burden on to the state provoked nothing like the opposition that families stirred when they pursued more novel practices, such as the use of prosecutions and institutionalization to discipline girls. A weaving of the legal culture of ruin into the web of negotiations around female sexuality that is described in the existing historical literature presents us with a more variegated, complex structure. It suggests that each court, each legal category, each institution, offered those ordinary Americans who were responding to sexual behaviour a different space, a different set of possibilities and constraints, a diversity, that we must more fully engage with in order to understand the nature of sexual modernity. 53 Under New York state statute, eligibility for jury service was restricted to men, between the ages of twenty-one and seventy years, who were residents of the city and citizens, who owned real or personal property worth at least $250, who were in possession of their natural faculties,
